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Abstract
In 1933 Kolmogorov constructed a general theory that defines the modern concept of
conditional probability. In 1955 Re´nyi fomulated a new axiomatic theory for probability
motivated by the need to include unbounded measures. We introduce a general concept of
conditional probability in Re´nyi spaces. In this theory improper priors are allowed, and the
resulting posteriors can also be improper.
Keywords: Foundations and philosophical topics (62A01), Bayesian inference
(62F15), Bayesian problems and characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10),
Haldane’s prior; Poisson intensity; Marginalization paradox; Measure theory;
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Figure 1: An estimate of the log of an improper posterior density. It is obtained by align-
ment of kernel density estimates based on separate MCMC run, each run restricted to different
subintervals.
1 Introduction
An often voiced criticism of the use of improper priors in Bayesian inference is that such priors
sometimes don’t lead to a proper posterior distribution. This can happen when the marginal
law of the data X is not σ-finite (Taraldsen and Lindqvist, 2010), as sometimes encountered in
applied settings with sparse data (Bord et al., 2018; Tufto et al., 2012).
The dangers of improper posteriors in Markov Chain Monte Carlo based methods of inference
are well recognized (e.g. Hobert and Casella, 1996). Within the theory to be presented here,
improper posteriors as such are well-defined, however, and in practical applied statistics it will
be of interest to develop numerical methods for computing such posterior densities. One possible
method is indicated by Tufto et al. (2012, Appendix S4) for data on tropical butterflies, and is
illustrated in Fig 1. The key idea is to consider the family of posteriors obtained from restriction
to intervals, and then glue the resulting posteriors together in a postprocessing step. This
simple idea is also the key for the general definition of the posterior we introduce in Section 3.
The definition is based on the family of conditional probabilities appearing in the axioms of a
conditional probability space as introduced by Renyi (1955).
As a simpler motivating example, suppose you observe a homogeneous Poisson process with
a scale invariant prior density (Jeffreys, 1939, p.122)
pi(λ) =
c
λ
(1)
on the Poisson intensity λ. The constant c is arbitrary, carries no information, and c = 1 is used
below. Similar arbitrary constants will, however, play an important role in the theory in later
parts of this paper. The marginal law of the number X of events in the interval (0, t] is then not
σ-finite since
P (X = 0) =
∫ ∞
0
P (X = 0|λ)pi(λ) dλ =
∫ ∞
0
(λt)0
0!
e−λt
dλ
λ
=∞ (2)
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If you observe X = 0 and formally multiply the prior by the likelihood you obtain an improper
posterior
pi(λ|X = 0) = e
−λt
λ
(3)
This posterior law for λ is different from the initial prior law, and we claim that this is a correct
way of incorporating the information given by X = 0. High values for λ are less probable given
the observation X = 0. Further updating can be done with this posterior as a prior, and this is
consistent with only one updating based on the initial prior.
A related example is the Beta posterior density for the success probability p given by
pi(p |x) = px−1(1− p)n−x−1 (4)
for a Bernoulli sequence with x successes out of n trials. This corresponds to the improper
Haldane (1932) prior (Jeffreys, 1939, p.123)
pi(p) = p−1(1− p)−1 (5)
The posterior is improper if x is zero as in the previous example. In all cases, however, the
observation of the number of successes x results in a corresponding updating of the uncertainty
associated with p. The posterior is in this case improper for x = 0 and for x = n. In all cases,
however, the posterior in equation (4) contains the information given by the observation x and
the prior in equation (5).
The Haldane prior is the prior that corresponds to the formal Bayes estimator pˆ = x/n
(Robert, 2007, p.29). This is the optimal frequentist estimator in the sense of being the unique
uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimator. Similar optimality phenomena motivates the
use of improper priors more generally (Berger, 1985, p.409), and is also linked to fiducial inference
(Taraldsen and Lindqvist, 2013).
Unfortunately, even people accepting the use of improper priors reject the above form of
inference, on the ground that the posterior is not a probability distribution, and a mathematical
theory is lacking for this (Robert et al., 2009). This is understandable, and we agree initially
with this point of view. We will demonstrate, however, that the above forms of, so far, formal
inference can be made consistent with the axiomatic system of Re´nyi which allows improper
laws. In Section 3 we develop his mathematical theory further to include general conditioning
on a σ-field. This gives a rigorous mathematical foundation for inference with unbounded laws
- including the previous three examples. The aim of this paper is to present key elements in a
mathematical and philosophical theory of statistics that allows improper laws both as priors and
posteriors based on the concept of a Re´nyi space (Ω, E ,P) as defined in the next section.
2 Statistics in Re´nyi space
The mathematical theory of statistics is thoroughly presented by Schervish (1995). We will
next present the initial ingredients in this theory. The purpose is to have a platform for a
generalization that effectively replaces the probability space of Kolmogorov (1933) with the
conditional probability space of Renyi (1970). The reader may feel that we include too many
elementary standard definitions, and we apologise for this. The reason is that there are small
differences in most books on foundations, and the easiest way to be precise is to be explicit.
For measure theory we follow mostly the conventions in the elegant treatment by Rudin (1987).
A particular interpretation is indicated together with the mathematical theory, but the reader
should recognise that many other interpretations are possible. We do not claim that there is one
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single “correct” interpretation, but we do claim that the indicated philosophical interpretation
is useful in many applied concrete problems.
The initial ingredient is an abstract underlying space Ω. This space Ω is a non-empty set
equipped with a law P which assigns a weight P(A) to all measurable sets A ⊂ Ω. The family
E of measurable sets is assumed to be a σ-field: (i) ∅ ∈ E , (ii) A ∈ E implies Ac ∈ E , and (iii)
A1, A2, . . . ∈ E implies ∪iAi ∈ E . The set Ω equipped with the family E of measurable sets is
then a measurable space (Rudin, 1987, p.8). A measurable set A is also referred to as an event
with a corresponding philosophical interpretation (Renyi, 1970, p.1-37).
The law P is a positive measure defined on E : (i) P(∅) = 0, (ii) A ∈ E implies 0 ≤ P(A) ≤ ∞,
(iii) If A1, A2, . . . ∈ E are disjoint, then P(
∑
iAi) =
∑
i P(Ai). Property (iii) is referred to
as countable additivity. It is the distinctive feature that separates the theory here from the
alternative approach of including improper laws by allowing finitely additive measures (Heath
and Sudderth, 1989) (Schervish, 1995, p.21). Additionally, in the theory of Kolmogorov, P(Ω) = 1
is assumed. The set Ω equipped with E and P is then a probability space. This is assumed in
the following paragraphs until the concept of a Re´nyi space is introduced.
A random quantity Z is a measurable function Z : Ω→ ΩZ (Schervish, 1995, p.583, p.606).
A function Z is measurable if (Z ∈ A) = Z−1(A) = {ω |Z(ω) ∈ A} is measurable for any
measurable A ⊂ ΩZ . Using this notation, the law PZ of Z is well defined by
PZ(A) = P(Z ∈ A) (6)
Another random quantity W = φ(Z) is defined by W (ω) = φ(Z(ω)) when φ : ΩZ → ΩW is
measurable. This implies PW = PZ ◦φ−1 so the law of W = φ(Z) is determined by the law of Z.
The general change-of-variables theorem E(φ(Z)) = EZ(φ) is also a consequence (Schervish, 1995,
Thm B.12). The notation E(W ) =
∫
W (ω) P(dω) is here used for the expectation of W . These
observations explain partly why the abstract space Ω can be left unspecified in applications.
The previous paragraph defines the law PT of a random quantity T . The notation P
t(A) =
P(A |T = t) is here used for the conditional law Pt on Ω. It is defined by the equation
P((T ∈ C)A) =
∫
C
Pt(A) PT (dt) (7)
The left-hand-side defines for each event A a measure on ΩT which is absolutely continuous with
respect to PT , and h(t) = P
t(A) is the unique density h ∈ L1(PT ) obtained from the Radon-
Nikodym theorem (Rudin, 1987, p.121). The conditional law PtZ of Z given T = t is defined by
PtZ(A) = P
t(Z ∈ A) = P(Z ∈ A |T = t) (8)
The general change-of-variables theorem implies that PtZ(A) = (PZ,T )
t(A×ΩT ) so the conditional
law PtZ is determined by the joint law PZ,T .
The previous gives some basic ingredients from probability theory needed in a mathematical
theory of statistics. For the theory of statistics Schervish (1995, p.82) assumes, as we also do,
that there is a single space Ω underlying also the statistical analysis for a particular model
θ with observed data x. The data X and the model Θ are random quantities. This means
that X : Ω→ ΩX and Θ : Ω→ ΩΘ are measurable functions. The data space ΩX is the set
corresponding to the possible observations x. It is commonly referred to as the sample space.
The model space ΩΘ is the set of possible model parameters θ. It is sometimes referred to as the
model parameter space. A parameter Γ = ψ(Θ) is by definition a function of the model Θ. It is
hence also consistent to refer to Θ as the model parameter. A statistic Y = φ(X) is by definition
a function of the data X. The function φ : ΩX → ΩY is sometimes referred to as an action,
and the set ΩY is then the action space. The parameter Γ is sometimes referred to as the focus
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ΩΘ ΩΓ
(Ω, E ,P)
ΩX ΩY
Focus ψ
M
od
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Θ
Statistic Y
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ata X
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r Γ
Action φ
Figure 2: A commutative diagram for a general statistical inference problem.
parameter, and the set ΩΓ is then the focus space. These concepts are as explained in much
more detail by Schervish (1995), but with some differences in notation and naming conventions.
The involved concepts are illustrated in the commutative diagram in Figure 2.
A statistical model for observed data x is conventionally specified by a family {PθX | θ ∈ ΩΘ}
of probability measures PθX indexed by the unknown model parameter θ (Lehmann and Casella,
1998, p.1). We assume additionally, as does Schervish (1995, p.83), that the statistical model is
given by the conditional law
PθX(A) = P(X ∈ A |Θ = θ) (9)
of the data X given Θ = θ. This requires also a specification of the data space ΩX and the model
space ΩΘ. The task for the statistician is to infer something about a chosen focus parameter
γ = ψ(θ) = Γ(ω) from the observed data x = X(ω). This is done by reporting a statistic
y = φ(x). The problem is then to choose or characterise a suitable action φ, and to implement
and perform associated calculations.
In Bayesian inference the prior PΘ is also specified, and together with the conditional law
PθX this determines the joint law of X and Θ. The joint law of the data X and the model Θ
determines the posterior law PxΘ. The simplicity and generality of this transformation of prior
knowledge PΘ into the posterior knowledge P
x
Θ given the data x is one major argument in favour
of the Bayesian paradigm. Additionally, it can be observed that the Bayes posterior expectation
φ(x) = Ex(Γ) exemplify that the Bayes posterior can be used to define many possible actions φ
in addition to the distribution estimator given by the posterior law φD(x) = P
x
Θ itself.
The previous paragraphs give a condensed presentation of some of the initial ingredients in
the well established mathematical theory of statistics as presented in considerable more detail
by Schervish (1995). We now turn to the more general case where Ω is a Re´nyi space as will be
defined in the next few paragraphs. Assume first that (Ω,P, E) is a σ-finite measure space. Let
B ⊂ E denote the family of elementary conditions B defined by the requirement 0 < P(B) <∞.
A family {P(· |B) |B ∈ B} of conditional probability measures is then defined by
P(A |B) = P(AB)
P(B)
, ∀A ∈ E , ∀B ∈ B (10)
It can be verified that B is a bunch (Renyi, 1970, Def.2.2.1): (i) ∅ 6∈ B, (ii) B1, B2 ∈ B implies
B1 ∪B2 ∈ B, (iii) There exists a sequence B1, B2, . . . ∈ B with Ω = ∪iBi. Condition (iii) follows
since P is σ-finite. Furthermore, B1, B2 ∈ B and B1 ⊂ B2 imply P(B1 |B2) > 0, and imply also
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the consistency requirement
P(A |B1) = P(AB1 |B2)
P(B1 |B2) (11)
This shows that a σ-finite measure (Ω, E ,P) generates a conditional probability space (Ω, E ,B,P).
A conditional probability space is a measurable space equipped with a consistent family of
conditional probabilities indexed by a bunch (Renyi, 1970, Def.2.2.2). The Re´nyi structure
theorem shows that every conditional probability space is generated by a corresponding σ-finite
measure (Renyi, 1970; Taraldsen and Lindqvist, 2016). It should be noted, however, that the
above construction given by equation (10) gives a maximal bunch and then a maximal family of
conditional probabilities. Consequently, every conditional probability space can be extended to
a maximal conditional probability space.
It can be noted that the family of conditional probabilities P(A |B) and the family B of
elementary conditions are unchanged if P is replaced by cP where c is a positive constant. The
Re´nyi state defined by P is the equivalence class [P] = {cP | c > 0}. The measures P and cP
are equivalent when interpreted as Re´nyi states, and the conditional probabilities P(A |B) give
the philosophical interpretation in statistical models. A Re´nyi space is here defined to be a
measurable space equipped with a Re´nyi state. It corresponds to a conditional probability space
where the bunch is maximal. Our definition here of a Re´nyi space is equivalent with the definition
of a full conditional probability space as used by Renyi (1970, p.43). We will follow conventional
abuse of notation and use the same symbol P for the equivalence class, a representative σ-finite
measure, and the family of conditional measures.
Consider now again the commutative diagram in Figure 2 corresponding to a general statis-
tical inference problem. It can be interpreted as before also when Ω is assumed to be a Re´nyi
space. A random quantity Z is a measurable function. It is said to be σ-finite if the law PZ
is σ-finite. The σ-finite functions define the natural arrows in the category of Re´nyi spaces. In
the case ΩZ = R our definition of Z being σ-finite is equivalent with Z being a regular random
variable as defined by Renyi (1970, p.73).
The prior PΘ(A) = P(Θ ∈ A) defines a Re´nyi state if Θ is σ-finite. The interpretation is
in terms of the conditional probabilities PΘ(A |B) for B ∈ BΘ = {B | 0 < PΘ(B) < ∞}. If
the variable Z = (X,Θ) and the data X are σ-finite, then the posterior PxΘ is well defined with
PxΘ(ΩΘ) = 1. This is discussed and exemplified by Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2010) and Lindqvist
and Taraldsen (2018). In the next section this theory will be generalised so that the posterior
PxΘ is also allowed to be a conditional Re´nyi state as needed for the butterfly, Poisson process,
and Bernoulli examples in Section 1
3 Improper posteriors as conditional Re´nyi states
Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2010, 2016) define the posterior law Px(A) = P(A |X = x) for the case
where the data X is σ-finite. The aim now is to prove existence and uniqueness of a posterior law
without assuming that X is σ-finite. The simple idea in the following is to define Px(A) from a
family Px(A |B) indexed by the elementary conditions B ∈ B. The later is defined by the family
of conditional probabilities P(A |B) defined by the Re´nyi state P. It is assumed throughout
this Section that (Ω, E ,P) is a Re´nyi space, and that all random quantities are defined on this
space. The bunch B associated to Ω is the family of events B ⊂ Ω defined by the requirement
0 < P(B) <∞.
Assume that T is a random quantity. If B ∈ B, then
P((T ∈ C)A |B) =
∫
C
Pt(A |B) PT (dt |B) (12)
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defines Pt(A |B) similarly to how Pt(A) was defined by equation (7). The left-hand-side defines
for each event A a measure on ΩT which is absolutely continuous with respect to PT (dt |B), and
h(t) = Pt(A |B) is the unique density h ∈ L1(PT (dt |B)) obtained from the Radon-Nikodym
theorem (Rudin, 1987, p.121).
If X is a random quantity, then the previous defines a family of posterior laws Px(· |B)
indexed by B ∈ B. This is the necessary ingredient for the interpretation of a posterior law.
This family is taken as the definition of the posterior law Px. The construction holds also more
generally for a conditional probability space with an arbitrary bunch. In the following we restrict
attention to Re´nyi spaces. The posterior law defines then a conditional Re´nyi state.
The next aim is to prove existence of a posterior law Px directly, and show that
Px(AB) = Px(A |B) Px(B), ∀A ∈ E ,∀B ∈ B,∀′x ∈ ΩX (13)
This generalization of the structure theorem of Re´nyi is the main result given below in Theorem 1.
Its precise statement requires some more definitions.
A σ-finite measure QT is by definition a pseudo-law of a random quantity T if {C |QT (C) =
0} = {C |PT (C) = 0}. If Q˜T is another pseudo-law, then the Radon-Nikodym theorem gives
existence of a unique c > 0 in L1loc(QT ) such that Q˜T (dt) = c(t)QT (dt). Existence of a pseudo-
law follows by defining QT (C) = Q(T ∈ C) where Q is a probability measure such that P (dω) =
W (ω)Q(dω) with W > 0 (Rudin, 1987, 6.9 Lemma). Given a pseudo-law QT , or more generally
a law QT that dominates PT , we define the conditional law P
t by the relation
P((T ∈ C)A) =
∫
C
Pt(A)QT (dt) (14)
The left-hand-side defines for each event A a measure on ΩT which is absolutely continuous
with respect to QT , and h(t) = P
t(A) is the unique density obtained from the Radon-Nikodym
theorem (Rudin, 1987, p.121, p.123). If c(t) > 0, then the previous shows that c(t) Pt(dω) is
the conditional law corresponding to the pseudo-law QT (dt)/c(t). This defines an equivalence
between conditional laws, and defines the unique conditional Re´nyi state Pt as an equivalence
class. The main mathematical result can now be stated.
Theorem 1. A random quantity T determines a unique conditional Re´nyi state Pt, and a unique
family of conditional Re´nyi states Pt(· |B) for B ∈ B such that ∀A ∈ E
Pt(AB) = Pt(A |B) Pt(B), ∀′t ∈ ΩT (15)
Proof. All that remains to prove is equation (15). Observe first that PT (C |B) = P((T ∈
C)B)/P(B) and P((T ∈ C)B) = ∫
C
Pt(B)QT (dt) give
PT (dt |B) = P
t(B)
P(B)
QT (dt)
Using this gives
∫
C
Pt(AB)QT (dt)/P(B) = P((T ∈ C)A |B) =
∫
C
Pt(A |B) PT (dt |B)
=
∫
C
Pt(A |B) Pt(B)QT (dt)/P(B), so∫
C
Pt(AB)QT (dt) =
∫
C
Pt(A |B) Pt(B)QT (dt)
and equation (15) is proved.
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All of the previous can be repeated with a replacement of the measurable set A with a
positive measurable function A : Ω→ [0,∞] and Et(A) = Pt(A). Conditional expectation of
complex valued functions can be defined by decomposition in positive and negative parts and
then in real and complex parts. Consideration of the dual space gives conditional expectation
of a separable Banach space valued A : Ω→B. The conditional expectation E(A |T = t) is in
particular well defined when A takes values in a separable Hilbert space. Separability is assumed
to ensure almost everywhere definition on ΩT .
Conditional expectation with respect to a σ-field T ⊂ E is defined by E(W | T ) = E(W |T )
where T (ω) = ω and (ΩT , ET ) = (Ω, T ). It can be noted that we define Pt(A) directly following
Kolmogorov instead of more indirectly by first defining P(A | T ) as is more common. This has the
advantage of allowing a completely general measurable space ΩT , whereas the common approach
requires separability properties according to Schervish (1995, p.616, Prop.B.24).
4 Examples
4.1 The uniform Re´nyi state on R
The most familiar example of an improper prior is given by Lebesgue measure m on the real
line ΩΘ = R equipped with the family EΘ of Borel sets A. The corresponding Re´nyi state is
the equivalence class PΘ = [m] = {cm | c > 0}. The Re´nyi state is equivalently given by the
bunch BΘ = {B ∈ EΘ | 0 < m(B) <∞}, and the family of conditional probabilities PΘ(A |B) =
m(AB)/m(B) for B ∈ BΘ and A ∈ EΘ. This defines a full conditional probability space in the
sense of Renyi (1970, p.43), or equivalently, in our terminology, a Re´nyi space.
In the context of statistical modeling it is furthermore assumed, as in Figure 2, that Θ is
a random variable defined on the underlying Re´nyi space (Ω, E ,P) with PΘ(A |B) = P(Θ ∈
AB)/P(Θ ∈ B). The latter can also be written as PΘ = P ◦Θ−1 or as PΘ(A) = P(Θ ∈ A)
where, as always, (Θ ∈ A) = {ω |Θ(ω) ∈ A}. These equations are interpreted as given for
representative measures in the equivalence classes.
The family B0 = {[−n, n] |n ∈ N} does not contain the empty set, it is closed under finite
unions, and there is a sequence Bj ∈ B0 with B1 ∪ B2 · · · = ΩΘ. The family B0 ⊂ BΘ is
therefor a bunch. The family of probability measures defined by mn(A) = m(ABn)/m(Bn)
for Bn = [−n, n] defines a conditional probability space (R, EΘ,B0, {mn}) in the sense of Renyi
(1970, Definition 2.2.2, p.38). The Re´nyi structure theorem ensures that this space is generated
by a σ-finite measure, or equivalently, that this conditional probability space can be extended to
a unique Re´nyi space. This Re´nyi space is given by the Re´nyi state PΘ described in the previous
paragraphs.
In applications the uniform law on the real line is often described as the limit of the probability
measures mn as n → ∞. The previous paragraph identifies the uniform law not as a limit, but
as given by the collection {mn |n ∈ N} of probability measures itself. The uniform Re´nyi state
m = PΘ can, however, also be obtained as limnmn = m. Each mn and m are interpreted as
Re´nyi states. The limit can be defined as in the convergence of conditional probability spaces
defined by (Renyi, 1970, p.57), but also in the sense of convergence of Re´nyi states given by
equivalence classes (Taraldsen and Lindqvist, 2016, p.5015)(Bioche and Druilhet, 2016).
The interpretation of PΘ comes from the definition of a conditional probability space as
discussed in more detail by Renyi (1970, p.34-38). Given that Θ ∈ B the law is the probability
distribution PΘ(· |B) concentrated on B. The interpretation of all these conditional probabilities
can be, depending on the situation at hand, in a frequentist sense or in a subjective Bayesian
sense. This generalizes to other unbounded laws including the priors and posteriors for the
butterfly, Poisson process, and Bernoulli examples in the Introduction. It is most important
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since it gives the needed interpretation of the mathematical theory in the context of statistical
inference. The same interpretation is in particular used for both the prior and the posterior.
They are on an equal footing, and this is how uncertainty is represented in the statistical model.
4.2 Conditional Re´nyi state densities
Assume that (X,Θ) ∼ f(x, θ)µ(dx)ν(dθ) for σ-finite measures µ and ν. It follows that (Θ |X =
x) ∼ f(x, θ)ν(dθ) by choosingQX = µ. This can be verified directly by the defining equation (14).
It follows in particular that this is consistent with the definition of an improper posterior as used
by Bioche and Druilhet (2016, p.1716). The previous can also be reformulated simply as
f(θ |x) = f(x, θ) (16)
There is no need for a normalization constant since two proportional densities are equivalent
when considered as conditional Re´nyi states. The symbol f is used here, and in the following,
as a generic symbol for a density and also for conditional densities. The arguments x ∈ ΩX and
θ ∈ ΩΘ give the interpretation as different functions.
Let c be a function with c(θ) > 0. In the context here this statement is interpreted as
stating that c : ΩΘ → R is measurable and that P(c(Θ) ≤ 0) = 0. Similar context dependent
interpretations are also used elsewhere, but then without further explanation. It follows then
that (X |Θ = θ) ∼ c(θ)f(x | θ)µ(dx), and so
f(· | θ) = c(θ)f(· | θ) (17)
when interpreted as a conditional Re´nyi densities. We will then also write f(x | θ) = c(θ)f(x | θ)
with this interpretation. The resulting equivalence class of conditional densities is the conditional
Re´nyi state density. These observations are special cases of the discussion before Theorem 1
leading to the definition of a conditional Re´nyi state as an equivalence class.
A formal prior density f(θ) gives the joint density c(θ)f(x | θ)f(θ), and this shows that the
interpretation of f(θ) as prior information is dubious in this case. It is only when the density
f(x | θ) is normalized that the common procedure of combining a prior density f(θ) with the
model density f(x | θ) into a resulting joint density f(x, θ) = f(x | θ)f(θ) and a posterior density
f(θ |x) is well defined. In all cases, however, the posterior density f(θ |x) is well defined as a
conditional Re´nyi state density from the joint density f(x, θ) as in equation (16). In general, the
problem with the prior arises when the statistical model PθX itself is allowed to be a conditional
Re´nyi state. The likelihood L(θ |x) = f(x | θ) = c(θ)f(x | θ) is not well defined in this case.
A concrete example with an undefined likelihood is discussed by Lavine and Hodges (2012,
p.43) and Lindqvist and Taraldsen (2018, p.102). They consider a Gaussian density
f(x | θ) = c(θ) exp(−θ x
TQx
2
) (18)
with a known n × n precision matrix Q ≥ 0. This is an improper density if Q has at least one
eigenvalue equal to zero, and then the likelihood is undefined due to the ambiquity introduced
by c. The normalization constant c is undefined. A seemingly natural candidate, motivated by
the proper model case Q > 0, is given by c(θ) = θn/2, and this was used initially in the computer
software WinBUGS (Lindqvist and Taraldsen, 2018, p.102). This choice in WinBUGS was later
changed into c(θ) = θ(n−1)/2. It is clear that, in this situation, a prior information in the form of
a prior density f(θ) can not be combined with the given improper model to give a well defined
posterior density f(θ |x).
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A possible solution is given by restricing x to the orthogonal complement of the null space of
Q. The model density is then proper, and c(θ) = θ(n−k)/2 is the correct normalization when k is
the dimension of the null space of Q. In the k = 1 case considered by Lindqvist and Taraldsen
(2018, p.103) this corresponds to a change from a uniform to a point mass distribution at 0
for (x1 + · · · + xn)/n. More generally, the model in equation (18) can be further specified as a
Gaussian distribution for x with point masses at k components. Anyhow, a well defined posterior
requires that the joint density f(x, θ), or more generally as just exemplified, a well defined joint
distribution of the data X and the model Θ. Lindqvist and Taraldsen (2018, p.103) obtain a
unique normalized posterior PxΘ only in the case where the data X is σ-finite. Theorem 1 ensures,
however, that a unique posterior Re´nyi state is defined also without requiring a σ-finite X.
A more transparent example is given by letting PX,Θ(dx, dθ) = dxdθ correspond to Lebesgue
measure in the plane. The law of X given Θ = θ and the posterior law of Θ given X = x
correspond then both to Lebesgue measure on the line. The factorization f(x, θ) = 1 = c(θ)pi(θ)
with pi(θ) = 1/c(θ) is completely arbitrary. This can be interpreted according to Hartigan (1983,
p.26) as saying that the marginal law is not determined by the joint law. The choice of a pseudo-
law QΘ plays a role similar to the role of choosing a marginal law in the theory of Hartigan. The
interpretation of Hartigan is discussed in more detail by Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2010), but it
differs from the interpretation here. We insist that the marginal law of Θ is uniquely determined
from the joint law of X and Θ. In the case here it is given by the measure PΘ(dθ) =∞·dθ which
is not σ-finite. It follows in particular that the decomposition PX,Θ(dx, dθ) = P
θ
X(dx) PΘ(dθ)
fails in this case. However, regardless of the choice of a pseudo-law QΘ, the decomposition
PX,Θ(dx, dθ) = P
θ
X(dx)QΘ(dθ) defines P
θ
X(dx) = dx uniquely as a conditional Re´nyi state.
4.3 Elementary conditional Re´nyi states
Let PΘ(dθ) = dθ1dθ2 be Lebesgue measure in the plane, and consider the indicator function of the
upper half plane: Γ = ψ(Θ) = (Θ2 > 0). It follows that PΓ =∞δ0+∞δ1 so Γ is not σ-finite. The
conditional law PγΘ(dθ) = [(γ = 1)(θ2 > 0) + (γ = 0)(θ2 ≤ 0)]dθ1dθ2 is, however, a well defined
unique conditional Re´nyi state. It corresponds to the dominating measure QΓ = δ0 + δ1. The
conditional law P1Θ is Lebesgue measure restricted to the upper half-plane and P
0
Θ is Lebesgue
measure restricted to the lower half plane. This demonstrates directly that the conditional law
is also defined when Γ is not σ-finite.
Consider more generally a random natural number T : Ω→ N. A dominating measure for
T is the counting measure QT on N. This gives P(A |T = t) = Pt(A) = P(A(T = t)). Let
B = (T = 1). The previous gives then the elementary definition of the law
P(A |B) = P(AB), P(B) > 0 (19)
The conditional P(A |B) is not defined from this argument when P(B) = 0 since P1(A) can
be arbitrarily specified in this case. The previous is consistent with the familiar P(A |B) =
P(AB)/P(B) for the case where 0 < P(B) <∞. A Re´nyi state is arbitrary up to multiplication
by a positive constant. It is an equivalence class of σ-finite measures. Theorem 1 gives the
existence of conditional expectations in full generality - including this elementary case. The
restriction 0 < P(B) <∞ for defining P(A |B) has here been relaxed to the condition P(B) > 0
by Theorem 1.
4.4 The marginalization paradox
Stone and Dawid (1972, p.370) consider inference for the ratio θ of two exponential means. They
assume that X and Y are independent exponentially distributed with hazard rates θφ and φ
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respectively, so Z = Y/X will have a distribution that only depends on θ. In fact, Z = θF ,
where F has a Fisher distribution with 2 and 2 degrees of freedom since a standard exponential
variable is distributed like a χ22/2 variable. Stone and Dawid (1972) conclude that the density is
f(z | θ) = θ−1(1 + z/θ)−2 = θ(θ + z)−2 (20)
and that the posterior density corresponding to a prior density pi(θ) is
pi(θ | z) ∝ θpi(θ)
(θ + z)2
(21)
A second argument considers a joint density for (x, y, θ, φ) from a joint prior pi(θ)dθdφ. This gives
pi(θ, φ |x, y) ∝ pi(θ)θφ2 exp(−φ(θx+y)), and the posterior density of θ follows by integration over
φ to be
pi(θ |x, y) ∝ θpi(θ)
(θx+ y)3
∝ θpi(θ)
(θ + z)3
(22)
Equation (22) gives a posterior given the data (x, y) that differs from the posterior found in
equation (21). This constitutes the argument and paradox presented originally by Stone and
Dawid (1972).
We will next reconsider the above example in view of the theory presented in the previous
Section. This has already been indicated by Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2010), and is discussed in
more detail by Lindqvist and Taraldsen (2018). Lindqvist and Taraldsen (2018) rely on a theory
where it is only allowed to condition on σ-finite statistics. We extend this argument now with
reference to Theorem 1 which allows conditioning on any statistic.
The initial assumptions are equivalent with a joint distribution given by the density:
f(x, z, θ, φ) = pi(θ)f(x, z | θ, φ) = pi(θ)θφ2xe−φx(θ+z) (23)
Integration over φ gives
f(x, z, θ) = pi(θ)θx−2(θ + z)−3 (24)
which implies
pi(θ |x, z) = pi(θ)θx−2(θ + z)−3 = pi(θ)θ(θ + z)−3 (25)
The second equality holds since it is equality in the sense given by an equivalence class as in
Theorem 1. The right hand side can be multiplied by an arbitrary positive function c(x, z)
without changing the equality sign. Equation (25) is equivalent with equation (22) since there
is a one-one correspondence between (x, y) and (x, z).
An alternative is to integrate equation (23) over x to obtain
f(z, θ, φ) = pi(θ)θ(θ + z)−2 (26)
which implies
pi(θ | z, φ) = pi(θ)θ(θ + z)−2 (27)
This is similar to equation (21), but the conditioning differs.
Reconsider now the argument leading to equation (21). The first observation was that Z =
Y/X has a distribution that only depends on θ. This is true, but it is still conditionally given
both θ and φ as assumed initially in the model. Equation (21) and equation (20) are wrong as
stated, interpreted as conditional Re´nyi states, but can be corrected by a replacement of f(z | θ)
by f(z | θ, φ) and pi(θ | z) by pi(θ | z, φ). The error in the original argument, as interpreted in the
theory presented here, is that it can not be concluded that pi(θ | z) = pi(θ | z, φ) even though the
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later does not depend on φ. Equation (27) is not in conflict with equation (25) for the same
reason.
More generally, it can be noted that even if a conditional law Px,z does not depend on x it can
not be concluded that it equals Pz. This is demonstrated by equation (25) and equation (27).
The rule Px,z = Pz holds for probability distributions, and also more generally if Z and (X,Z)
are σ-finite given that Px,z does not depend on x. Stone and Dawid (1972) calculated formally as
if the rule where generally valid. This resulted in two conflicting results. This example, and the
other examples constructed by Stone and Dawid (1972) are most important since they illustrate
important differences between the theories of Kolmogorov and Re´nyi . Stone and Dawid (1972)
pointed out that purely formal manipulations with improper distributions, treated as if they
obeyed all the rules of proper distributions, could lead to paradoxical inconsistencies — which
by reductio ad absurdum — is an argument against doing such formal computations.
4.5 The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox
Observations can give rejection of a simple hypothesis at the 5% level, but a Bayesian analysis
can give the hypothesis a posterior probability larger than 95%. Lindley (1957) discussed this
seemingly paradoxical phenomena with reference to previous work by Jeffreys (1939). Both
Berger (1985, p.148-156) and Robert (2007, p.230-236) give thorough discussions of the problem
of testing a point null hypothesis, and explain that the use of improper priors is a delicate issue in
this case. This has also been emphasized in several discussion papers (Shafer, 1982; Berger and
Sellke, 1987; Berger and Delampady, 1987; Robert et al., 2009; Robert, 2014). A full discussion
of this problem in the context of the theory of Re´nyi will not be given here, but we will indicate
some consequences and observations.
The most important is to note that any prior, improper or not, contains information. We
agree with Robert (2007, p.29) that it is a mistake to think of improper priors as representing
ignorance. This is particularly important when testing a point null hypothesis, which in most
situations implies a non-symmetric treatment of the hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis.
The relevance of the information is specific to each particular case with its own interpretation.
Re´nyi explained that improper laws can be interpreted in terms of the associated family of
conditional probabilities. This holds for both prior and posterior laws, and also so in a hypothesis
testing problem.
Assume that x ∼ N(θ, σ2) with unknown mean θ ∈ ΩΘ = R and known variance σ2 so
f(x | θ) = [√2piσ]−1 exp(− 12 (x− θ)2/σ2). Consider the hypothesis H0 = {0} ⊂ ΩΘ versus the
alternative H1 = H
c
0 = {θ ∈ ΩΘ | θ 6∈ H0}. This basic hypothesis testing problem is often the
first example of hypothesis testing presented to statistics students using the notation H0 : θ = 0
versus H1 : θ 6= 0. Our notation identifies the hypothesis and its alternative more explicitly with
a partition H0 +H1 of the model parameter space ΩΘ.
The uniformly most powerful unbiased level α test rejects H0 if (Casella and Berger, 1990,
p.374)
t = φ(x) = 2Φ(− |x/σ|) ≤ α (28)
where Φ(z) = P(Z ≤ z) with Z ∼ N(0, 1). The test statistic T = φ(X) is the p-value. It is
a probability, but it must not be confused with the posterior probability of H0 given the data.
The posterior probability is undetermined in this classical analysis.
Consider next a Bayesian analysis with a prior density pi with respect to the measure ν(dθ) =
δ0(dθ) + dθ. The Dirac measure δ0 is dimensionless, and it is hence assumed that θ, x, and σ
are dimensionless in the following. A Bayesian test with minimal posterior risk rejects H0 if the
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Figure 3: Two test statistics for testing H0 : θ = 0 versus H1 : θ 6= 0 based on x ∼ N(θ, σ2).
posterior probability of H0 given the data is small (Berger, 1985, p.164)
s = φpi(x) = pi(0 |x) =
[
1 +
∫
f(x | θ)pi(θ)dθ
f(x | 0)pi(0)
]−1
≤ LII
LII + LI
(29)
LI is the loss corresponding to a type I error, LII is the loss corresponding to a type II error, and
the loss is zero otherwise. The classical and Bayesian tests are similar in form, but the Bayesian
test statistic S = φpi(X) depends on the prior density pi. We have here restricted attention to
the case where the posterior is proper, and the above integral is then finite.
Consider first the constant prior pi∞(θ) = c. This gives
φ∞(x) = [1 + f(x | 0)−1]−1 = [1 +
√
2piσ exp
(
x2
2σ2
)
]−1 (30)
Figure 3 shows the remarkable similarity between the p-value and the posterior probability for
the case σ = 1. Robert (2007, p.234) also notes this similarity in his Table 5.2.5, and discusses
this phenomena. This similarity, and more generally the close resemblance in practice between
Bayesian and classical methods for many common statistical problems, is a common theme in
the early fundamental texts on Bayesian statistics (Jeffreys, 1939; Lindley, 1965; Savage, 1954).
A common way to justify usage of improper priors is to consider limits of proper priors.
Consider the sequence pi1, pi2, . . . of proper prior densities defined by pin(0) = pi(0) and pin(θ) =
(1− pi(0))gn(θ) for θ 6= 0. Let gn(0) = 0 and gn(θ) = [
√
2piτn]
−1 exp(− 12θ2/τ2n) for θ 6= 0. Define
also g∞(0) = 0 and g∞(θ) = 1 for θ 6= 0. If the variance τ2n → ∞, then gn → g∞ intuitively
as densities since a normally distributed variable with infinite variance should correspond to
a variable with a constant density. This convergence is in fact true if interpreted as densities
with respect to dθ in the sense of q-vague convergence (Bioche and Druilhet, 2016). It seems
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hence reasonable to take the sequence pi1, pi2, . . . of proper densities as an approximation of the
improper density pi∞(θ) = c = pi(0). The point mass pi(0) at θ = 0 is then fixed, and the densities
for θ 6= 0 approximate the flat density. Equation (29) gives, however, that pin(0 |x) → 1, since∫
f(x | θ)pin(θ) dθ → 0. This is in conflict with pi∞(0 |x) ≤ [1 +
√
2piσ]−1. The source of the
problem is that the generalized density pin = pi(0)δ0 + (1− pi(0))gn with respect to dθ does not
converge to the density pi∞ = pi(0)δ0 + (1 − pi(0))g∞ as intuition would suggest, but instead
pin → δ0 as explained by Bioche and Druilhet (2016).
The previous can be used to illustrate the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox. Assume that x is sta-
tistically significantly different from 0 at the α level of significance in the sense of φ(x) ≤ α as
defined by equation (28). The convergence pin(0 |x) → 1 ensures, however, that the posterior
probability piN (0 |x) > 1 − α for a prior piN with a sufficiently large N . This can, of course,
only be considered to be paradoxical in a situation where the prior piN is reasonable. Consider
instead a symmetric proper prior on the form pi(0) = 1/2 and pi(θ) = g(θ)/2 for θ 6= 0 where
g(|θ|) is non-increasing in |θ|. The critical values 1.645, 1.960 and 2.576 for x/σ corresponds to
the p-values 10%, 5% and 1% as also indicated in Figure 3. The corresponding posterior values
pi(0 |x) are, however, bounded from below by 39%, 29%, and 10% for any prior on the given form
(Berger, 1985, p.154, Table 4.4). The conclusion is that a large class of reasonable symmetric
proper priors gives a posterior probability much larger than the classical p-value. This is an even
more striking illustration of the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox.
Consider again the improper prior density pi∞(θ) = c with respect to ν(dθ) = δ0(dθ) + dθ.
The value of the constant c is of no concern, as we know from the general theory, and also
explicitly from equation (30). Equation (30) has, however, a dependency on σ that is a concern.
It follows that the prior pi∞ corresponds effectively to two different priors if a concrete problem is
formulated first in terms of one measurement scale and then alternatively in terms of a different
measurement scale. The p-value does not share this defect, since it only depends on the scaled
variable x∗ = x/σ as given in equation (28). An alternative prior is obtained by reformulating
the original problem in scaled variables and using the prior pi∞ for this problem. Transforming
back gives the improper density pi∗(0) = σ and pi∗(θ) = 1 for θ 6= 0. The result is a posterior
probability pi∗(0 |x) that only depends on x∗ = x/σ, and it is remarkably close to the p-value as
shown in Figure 3 for all values of σ.
It was seen above that a seemingly reasonable approximation by proper priors failed. An
alternative sequence of proper priors is obtained by using the interpretation Re´nyi gives for the
prior corresponding to the density pi∗. Let Bn = [−nσ, nσ] for n = 1, 2, . . .. The conditional
probability PΘ(A |Bn) is then given by the proper density pi∗n defined by pi∗n(0) = 1/(1 + 2n) and
pi∗n(θ) = [−n ≤ θ/σ ≤ n]/(σ+ 2nσ) for θ 6= 0. In this case pi∗n(0 |x)→ pi∗(0 |x), and this gives in
particular a proper prior with a posterior that approximates the p-value as shown in Figure 3.
The appropriateness of a prior on this form can not be decided in general, but must be decided
in each concrete case.
Consider finally a concrete problem where it is assumed that the prior density pi∗ gives a
reasonable prior for θ. Assume that a measurement is done and x ∼ N(θ, σ2) is observed. In
this case, the classical and Bayesian procedures are very similar if α = LII/(LI + LII) = 5%.
Assume next that the experimenter chooses to repeat the measurement N − 1 more times. The
prior information is, of course, not changed by this decision, so the prior is still given by pi∗. A
sufficient statistic is given by the empirical mean x ∼ N(θ, σ2/N). The classical p-value and the
posterior probability pi∗(0|x) are in this case very different if N s large. It follows in particular
that pi∗(0|x)→ 1 as N →∞ for all fixed x, and the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox reappears. We see
this, in fact, as no paradox, but as a most important and striking demonstration of an important
difference between Bayesian and classical inference.
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4.6 Hypothesis testing with improper posteriors
The possibility of improper posteriors was not considered in the previous discussion of the
Jeffreys-Lindley paradox. It was, in fact, demonstrated that there exist a proper prior so that
the classical and the Bayesian decision rules essentially coincides as shown in Figure 3. This
proper prior appears naturally from the Re´nyi interpretation of a corresponding improper prior
in terms of a family of conditional probabilities. It was also noted that this improper prior can
be approximated arbitrary well by a sequence of proper priors in a natural topology for Re´nyi
states given by q-vague convergence (Bioche and Druilhet, 2016).
Another observation is that, in general, a classical matching prior is typically improper.
DeGroot (1973) demonstrates, by an elegant argument, how a matching prior can be determined
for a different problem. A classical matching prior is here defined to be a prior such that the
posterior coincides with the p-value. The prior pi∗ is only approximately matching as shown in
Figure 3. A matching prior - if it exists - is determined by the integral equation that follows
by equating α and LII/(LI + LII) in equation (28) and equation (29). We will not discuss this
further here, but observe that a solution is given explicitly by an inverse Fourier transformation.
The butterfly, Poisson process, and Bernoulli examples in the Introduction can be used to
exemplify a hypothesis testing problem with an improper posterior. Consider, instead, testing of
H0 : γ ≤ 0 versus H1 : γ > 0 based on observing x ∼ N(γ, σ2) with unknown θ = (γ, σ) ∈ ΩΘ =
R× R+. This problem, but with known variance σ2, is considered by Berger (1985, p.147-148).
He notes that a constant prior corresponds to an infinite mass to both hypothesis, but argues
that this can be tackled by consideration of increasingly larger intervals. The essence of the
following argument is that this argument should in principle then be equally possible for the
posterior. This is given by the general interpretation of any Re´nyi state by its corresponding
family of conditional probabilities.
Assume that the prior density is pi(θ) = 1/σ with respect to ν(dθ) = dγdσ. The posterior
is then improper, and given by the density pi(θ |x) = σ−2 exp(− 12 (θ − x)2/σ2). It follows that
P(Θ ∈ H0 |X = x) = P(Θ ∈ H1 |X = x) = ∞, and it is not obvious how to formulate a
decision rule. The interpretation of Re´nyi leads to consideration of the posterior probability
PxΘ(H0 |B) for all B with 0 < P(Θ ∈ B) < ∞. In an application it can, possibly, be argued
that it is sufficient to consider elementary events on the form B(m,n) = (−m,m) × (1/n, n).
This determines corresponding posterior probabilities φm,n(x) for H0 which should be considered
when deciding to reject H0 or not. We leave the further discussion of this for the future.
Another possible approach is presented next. The posterior gives the two improper marginal
densities
pi(σ |x) = σ−1 (31)
pi(γ |x) = |γ − x|−1 (32)
The posterior for σ has no dependence on x as intuition would suggest without any further
argument. The posterior for γ is symmetric around x - again in harmony with intuition. The
posterior for γ is improper, but it clearly represents an updating of the state of knowledge
regarding γ. As a technical aside it can be observed that the posterior for γ is in fact not σ-
finite, but the posterior for σ is σ-finite. It is only the full posterior that is guarantied to be
represented by a conditional Re´nyi state by Theorem 1.
For the given hypothesis testing problem it can seem natural to replace the model space ΩΘ
with the focus space ΩΓ = R. The hypothesis are then represented by H∗0 = {γ | γ ≤ 0} and
H∗1 = {γ | γ > 0}. Motivated by the interpretation from Re´nyi it seems natural to consider the
elementary events B(m,n) = (−m,m) \ (x− 1/n, x+ 1/n) with m > |x|. The singularity of the
posterior at γ = x can then be tackled by taking the limit n → ∞ for the resulting posterior
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probabilities φm,n(x) for H0. This leads to φm(x) = φm,∞(x) = (x ≤ 0). The conclusion from
this argument is to reject H0 : γ ≤ 0 if x > 0.
5 Final remarks
Lindley (1965, p.xi) wrote in 1964 in the preface of his classic book on Bayesian statistics:
The axiomatic structure used here is not the usual one associated with
the name of Kolmogorov. Instead one based on the ideas of Re´nyi has
been used.
It can be concluded that Lindley initially supported the use of conditional probability spaces as
introduced by Re´nyi. We have argued that Lindley’s initial intuition is correct. The theory of
Re´nyi gives a natural approach to Bayesian statistics including commonly used objective priors.
The marginalization paradoxes seem to have been the main reason for Lindley’s change in
opinion on this. Tony O’Hagan interviewed Lindley for the Royal Statistical Society’s Bayes 250
Conference held in June 2013. Lindley explains very nicely that all probabilities are conditional
probabilities, but also recalls his reaction to the marginalization paradoxes presented by Stone
and Dawid (1972): Good heavens, the world is collapsing about me. In the interview, Lindley
continuous to argue that Bayesian statistics is a sound theory, and that the focus should be on
how to quantify the prior uncertainty of the unknown parameters. The parameters should be
viewed as real physical quantities regardless of which experiment is later used for decreasing their
uncertainty. This clearly disqualifies the choice of data dependent priors, and even the choice of
priors depending on the particular statistical model used. We wholeheartedly agree with Lindley
on this, but we claim that this can be done also within the more general theory introduced by
Re´nyi and continued here.
Historically, the most influential initial work on Bayesian inference is possibly given by the
book by Jeffreys (1939). Jeffreys (1939, p.21) argues in particular that the normalization of
probabilities is a rule generally adopted, but that the value∞ is needed in certain cases. This is in
line with current usage of Bayesian arguments (Berger, 1985; Robert, 2007). It is well established
that inference based on the posterior gives, indeed, a most rewarding path for obtaining useful
inference procedures from both a frequentist and a Bayesian perspective (Berger, 1985; Schervish,
1995; Lehmann and Romano, 2005). Parts of Jeffreys arguments were mainly intuitive, and there
is a lack of mathematical rigor as also observed by Robert et al. (2009). We suggest that a rigorous
reformulation of some of the original and most important ideas of Jeffreys (1939) can be done
within the mathematical theory presented here.
Within this framework we reach the view that improper posteriors, just as improper priors, are
not ‘improper’ but reflect the updated state of knowledge about a parameter after conditioning
on the data. Returning to the introductory Poisson-process example, at time t, we have clearly
learned something about λ in that our belief in large values of the Poisson intensity λ has
decreased while our relative degree of belief in small values of λ has remained approximately
unchanged. An improper posterior does not imply that our prior was wrong, but only that more
data perhaps needs to be collected if possible. Proceeding by using the improper posterior at
time t as prior in subsequent inference, say based on the number of occurrences observed in
a sufficiently long subsequent interval (t, t2], we indeed eventually reach the same proper final
posterior as the one reached by combining the initial scale prior and the likelihood for the data
on (0, t2]. We hope that the reader can appreciate that this argument indicates also the potential
philosophical importance of unbounded laws more generally.
An unbounded law can, according to Re´nyi , be interpreted by the corresponding family of
conditional probabilities given by conditioning on the events in the bunch. These elementary
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conditional probabilities are probabilities in the sense of Kolmogorov, and the interpretation
depends on the application. They can, as Lindley (2006) advocates convincingly, be interpreted
as personal probabilities corresponding to a range of real life events. They can also, as needed
in for instance quantum physics, be interpreted as objectively true probabilities representing a
law for how a system behaves when observed repeatedly under idealized conditions.
Assume now that you accept a theory where the prior uncertainty is given by a possibly
unbounded law. It is then natural, we claim, that you accept that a resulting posterior uncer-
tainty can also be represented by a possibly unbounded law. Both the prior and the posterior
represent uncertainty of the same kind. Hopefully, many can agree on this on an intuitive level.
The main mathematical result presented here is Theorem 1 which provides a key ingredient in
a mathematical model for statistics in which this can be done consistently without paradoxical
results. This key ingredient is a well defined extension of the concept of conditional expectation
as introduced originally by Kolmogorov (1933) to also include the case of Re´nyi spaces.
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